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The security of a passive plug-and-play QKD arrangement in the case of finite (resources) key lengths 
is analysed. It is assumed that the eavesdropper has full access to the channel so an unknown and 
untrusted source is assumed. To take into account the security of the BB84 protocol under collective 
attacks within the framework of quantum adversaries, a full treatment provides the well-known 
equations for the secure key rate. A numerical simulation keeping a minimum number of initial 
parameters constant as the total error sought and the number of pulses is carried out. The remaining 
parameters are optimized to produce the maximum secure key rate. Two main strategies are addressed: 
with and without two-decoy-states including the optimization of signal to decoy relationship. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The need to communicate messages secretly is in the roots of humanity. To provide secure 
communications without the flaw of being potentially insecure as technology improves, the concept 
of unconditional security has been introduced. This security is based on mathematical properties 
instead of the present day adversary’s abilities. As is well known, the Vernam cipher fulfils the 
unconditional security while the secret key is not reused. As a consequence, the cryptographic 
protocol needs a secure source of fresh keys to be distributed between the interlocutors (usually 
called Alice and Bob). The main goal for the QKD [1] protocols and set-ups is to provide these 
secret keys to the users. In this framework, decoy state method [2] brought about a significant 
improvement in the QKD performance. The main idea of decoy states is that Alice changes, at 
random, the characteristics of some extra pulses (decoy states) sent to Bob, revealing this 
information only at the end of the transmission. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot adjust her attack 
to each pulse shared. This extra knowledge allows the interlocutors (in the post-processing step) to 
improve the estimations of the parameters involved in the key distribution task. This represents a 
way of mitigating the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack on QKD protocols using weak laser 
pulses. If decoy-states are used with the BB84 protocol, the secure key rate is proportional to the 
overall transmittance, even for attenuated light, instead of the usual square dependence when no 
decoy states are used. As the channel transmission is usually quite low, this fact increases the key 
rate when decoy states are used. When an infinite number of decoy states are used, the interlocutors 
can accurately estimate the variables involved in the key rate. In practice, the two decoy states 
method (vacuum + weak decoy) is enough to provide good results. 
Despite the security protocols are well understood, proofs about their security, although of 
crucial interest, has shown to be hard work. For QKD, in the asymptotic limit of very long key 
lengths, the unconditional security [3] has already been proven. Several strategies have been used, 
based on: the uncertainty principle [4], the entanglement distillation protocols [5] even with 
imperfects devices [6] and the information-theoretical techniques [7]. A complementarity scenario 
[8,9,10] has been used to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the key distillation. 
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In security proofs against collective attacks, Alice and Bob usually have to characterize the 
density matrix of their shared state. Some recent techniques provided a tighter bound with 
unconditional security using uncertainty relations [11]. Better key generation rates, valid for general 
coherent attacks that guarantee unconditional security, are presented in [12] for the BB84 protocol 
with finite key lengths. 
Cryptographic primitives are often used as components of other protocols, so it is natural to 
require the security of these new schemes. The notion is captured by the universal security: a 
cryptographic primitive is universally secure if it is secure in any arbitrary context. Unfortunately 
some commonly-used security definitions do not fulfil this property. 
A typical QKD scenario involves two phases: (i) the generation and distribution of quantum 
signals and (ii) a discussion between Alice (the emitter) and Bob (the receiver) through an 
authenticated classic channel to carry out some tasks such as sifting, error estimation, error 
correction and privacy amplification. If Eve (the eavesdropper) carries out an individual attack on 
the signals, the whole process can be characterized by means of a three-random variable probability 
P(KA,KB,Z) representing the classic results for Alice and Bob’s keys (KA, KB) and Eve’s information 
(Z). Then, the interlocutors can see if a public discussion can transform the data into a secret key 
providing a positive key generation rate R (here defined as the average number of final secure key 
bits from each initial pulse sent). In this case, the security condition could be inherited from a 
classic one, basically requiring that KA = KB = K (except with a small probability ), having the 
maximum Shannon entropy and sharing a minimum information with Eve, i.e. 

)(K:ZI max
Z
.  
The key generation rate (R) fulfils two bounds: a) 
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))()()()((  (Csiszár-Körner [13]), and b) R  
I(KA,KBZ)) (Maurer [14]), (I(*:*) being the mutual information and I(KA,KBZ) the intrinsic 
information). The lower bound (a) is carried out by taking the maximum with respect to all of Eve’s 
possible attacks giving rise to the random variable Z. For this purpose, in a first step, Alice and Bob 
carry out an error correction by means of a one-way method, with either Alice providing error 
information (the first term in the equation) or vice versa (the second term in the equation). In the 
second step, Alice and Bob execute a privacy amplification protocol shortening the key length by a 
fraction I(KA:Z) or I(KB:Z), depending on the direction of the communication. The upper bound (b) 
is written by means of intrinsic information defined as: 
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the infimum of )( ZK,KI BA  taken over all possible conditional distributions )( Z ZP , Z being the 
output of a channel characterized by the conditional probability )( Z ZP . The intrinsic information 
measures the information that Bob learns about Alice’s information, after Eve has published her 
data. If Bob’s information depends only on Eve’s data, the intrinsic information vanishes and R = 0. 
The aforementioned security definition, although reasonable, has significant weaknesses. The 
value of  cannot be zero because perfect security (=0) is impossible using a probabilistic QKD 
protocol or running for a finite time, i.e., providing finite key lengths. As a consequence, the 
definition does not guarantee the universal security of the key. The reason is that we cannot force 
Eve to carry out a measure to get classic information. Eve is free to keep the information stored in 
quantum states (quantum adversaries), generally until any later time convenient to her. This strategy 
is permitted in collective attacks. Although the value of I(K:Z) were negligible small, it may be that 
the key were completely insecure [15]. A new definition of -security fulfilling the universal 
security condition has already been proposed and will be considered in section 2.3. 
Just after introducing the concept of decoy states, some attempts were carried out to introduce 
the parameter fluctuation coming from using finite resources. In [16], the theoretical effect of the 
fluctuations appearing in a real-life QKD experiments is considered using several decoy protocols. 
Fluctuations are also taken into account in some experimental implementations as in [17]. The effect 
of source errors and statistical fluctuations in a 3-intensity decoy-state protocol is treated in [18]. 
The -security definition is assumed in some theoretical analyses. In [19], the effect of a finite key is 
studied although optimal error correction and no parameter fluctuation is assumed. Some 
improvement in the secret key rate is achieved by modifying the parameter estimation strategy in 
[20]. Simple arguments [21] allows to estimate that no secret-key could extracted if the number of 
pulses considered is smaller than 10
5
-10
6
. 
One of the most widely used set-ups to carry out QKD is the so-called “plug-and-play” 
arrangement. Its security is not so obvious because the device permits Eve to manipulate the pulses 
in any sophisticated way for her purposes. This fact gives rise to serious limitations to guarantee its 
security. In spite of some results have been achieved using the -security criterion in [22,23,24], 
they are not strictly applicable to these devices. The objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of 
the key finiteness, by means of the -security definition, when a plug-and-play set-up for QKD is 
used. Several situations, for infinite and finite key lengths will be dealt with and without decoy 
states and including weak + vacuum two-decoy states. In section 2, the main characteristics 
assumed for the set-up are compiled in addition to the theoretical description, both in the infinite as 
well as the finite key case including decoy states or not. Section 3 shows the results of the numerical 
simulation optimizing the main parameters. 
 
 
2 Secure key rate for BB84 protocol 
 
The original BB84 protocol involves a perfect 1-photon source, not completely available yet 
with the current technology. Instead of these sources, weakly coherent ones have been extensively 
used. In this context, the BB84 protocol has been demonstrated to be secure, by means of the 
tagged/untagged pulse distinction. The concept of tagged qubits (as having its information revealed 
to Eve, i.e. multi-photon pulses prone to photon-number-splitting attack) and untagged qubits (as 
secure to Eve’s observation, i.e. 1-photon states), have been introduced in [6]. In the well-known 
GLLP method, post-processing takes advantage of this separation of pulses. In the first step, Alice 
and Bob sacrifice a fraction h2(E) of all qubits (or pulses) of the raw key (E being the quantum bit 
error rate QBER) and h2 the usual binary Shannon information function. The second post-
processing step is to apply privacy amplification to the untagged qubits (pulses) because they are the 
secret fraction of the key. The secret key rate in the asymptotic limit of infinitely long keys is:  
 
R

 = q {-f(E) Q h2(E) + Q1 [1-h2(E1)]}, 
 
q being the sifting factor (q=1/2 for BB84) and f(E) is the error correction inefficiency (usually f(E) 
 1), Q the overall gain and Q1 and E1 are the gain and error of untagged qubits. Unfortunately, the 
plug-and-play devices have their own peculiar security characteristics because the eavesdropper 
could tamper with the source and the channel. Therefore it is not allowed to suppose any specific 
light statistic, thus making the security analysis difficult. In spite of the above definition between 
tagged/untagged pulses being a good tool to discuss the security, their definition has to be slightly 
modified for these set-ups. 
Together with a weak coherent light source, the squash model for Bob’s detector is assumed 
[25,6]. In this model, the detection device is described by means of a two-step process: first, the 
photon signal is filtered and mapped (squashed) into a single photon state (qubit), i.e. a two-
dimensional Hilbert space. If it succeeds, an ideal measurement is carried out; otherwise, the 
detector output shows a signal failure. The squashing model has been demonstrated for the BB84 
protocol [26], even including the implementation of a passive basis choice [27], allowing security 
proofs [28] based on the assumption that Eve only sends one-photon states. 
 
 
2.1 The plug-and-play set-up 
 
One of the most widely used set-ups to carry out QKD is the so-called “plug-and-play” architecture. 
Bob (the final receiver) generates bright pulses that are sent to Alice (the final emitter) through the 
noisy channel connecting them. Alice encodes the information, attenuates the pulses, and sends 
them back to Bob. Eve has full control of the channel and, in the worst case, could replace any 
signal with a sophisticated one in order to achieve the best result (Trojan horse attack, [29]). To 
study the set-up security, the source is assumed to be completely unknown, as Eve can have a full 
control of it. This scenario is called QKD with unknown and untrusted source (UUS). 
This situation has been analysed in detail in [30] for the case of infinite key lengths using an 
active method to sample the untrusted source and, in [31, 32], the authors propose a passive strategy 
(more appropriate to experimental implementation) to evaluate the secure key rate, providing an 
estimation of the effect of the finite key length, but without using a full treatment. 
In this work, the main lines proposed in [31, 32] for a passive set-up, that are compiled in the 
following, will be assumed. Bob generates bright coherent pulses (with an average photon number 
per pulse MB) that are sent to Alice through a noisy channel with transmittance  (= B 10
-L/10
, B = 
internal losses of Bob’s device, L = channel length and  = channel loss coefficient in dB/km). Eve 
has full control of the source and the communication channel and, as a consequence, it is no longer 
correct to assume a Poissonian distribution for the photon number statistics of Bob’s source, as is 
usually supposed in standard security proofs. Therefore, Alice should consider the source is 
completely unknown and untrusted (UUS). Alice has to introduce some strategies to improve the 
security of the whole process. The pulses received in Alice’s set-up cross a filter to guarantee the 
single mode assumption, and a phase randomizer, transforming the pulse into a mixture of Fock 
states. The final secret key will be extracted only from the subset of pulses having a photon number 
m in the interval m  [(1-) MA, (1+) MA],  being a small positive number and MA is a parameter 
to be chosen by Alice and Bob, and can be identified as the average photon number per pulse of 
Alice’s source. These pulses are defined as untagged and those out of this range are tagged. In order 
to obtain information on the photon number distribution of untagged pulses, Alice needs to monitor 
its energy. In the passive strategy, she uses a beam splitter (qA/1-qA) connected to an intensity 
detector (see the upper part of figure 1). Then, the pulses are sent to an encoder and an attenuator 
with transmittance . All of Alice’s internal losses are modelled as a /(1-) beam splitter, 0    
1. Finally, the pulses are sent back to Bob. To calculate the final key generation rate R by means of 
this passive strategy, Alice should estimate the fraction of untagged coding pulses from her 
measurements of the number of photon of each sampling pulse, using the intensity monitor. The 
probability bounds are also needed. 
The estimation of the untagged pulse fraction is not as easy as one might think at first sight. In 
the splitting step, each pulse is separated into two: the U pulse sent to the encoder and the L pulse 
sent to the intensity monitor (see figure 1). One might argue that measuring the photon number of 
an L pulse could infer the photon number of its U partner. But this is not correct. For a pair (U, L) 
coming from the same pulse, the total number of photons is (constant but) unknown. Then, the 
number of photons of both pulses are correlated variables and do not fulfil the random sampling 
theorem. Fortunately, it can be demonstrated [32] that the number of untagged U pulses can be 
upper bounded to the number of untagged L pulses (measured by Alice’s device) with a confidence 
parameter that depends on the total number of pulses. 
Now we need to estimate the probability bounds to calculate R. This passive set-up is easily 
analysed by considering an equivalent (in the sense of providing the same probability bounds) 
active arrangement in which, instead of the beam splitter (qA/1-qA), another beam splitter (qA’/(1-
qA’)  (1-qA)/qA (assuming the detector efficiency is the unit) and an optical active switch (50%) is 
used (see figure 1 and details in [31, 32]).  
 
 
Fig.1. Alice’s plug-and-play set-ups: passive arrangement and equivalent active arrangement 
 
 
The starting point will be to characterize the unknown and untrusted source. Restricting the 
analysis to untagged pulses, makes the security analysis easier, as its narrow range of photon 
numbers allows us to obtain some upper and lower bounds for the photon distribution probabilities 
(see Eqs. 1a, b). 
In spite of the source being completely unknown, as regards the untagged pulses, after Alice’s 
attenuator, the conditional probability that n photons are emitted by Alice given m photon going in 
(see figure 1), follows the binomial distribution P(nm) = (mn) 
n
 (1-)m-n. Under the condition (1+) 
MA < 1 (reflecting an expected output photon number for untagged bits lower than 1), this 
distribution can be upper and lower bounded by [30]: 
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The value of MA depends on the specific source used and the parameters  and  being 
optimized to provide the biggest secret key rate. Even if the source is UUS, the previous equations 
provide some bounds characterizing the photon number probabilities. 
By fulfilling the condition ’ qA’ =  qA, both arrangements (passive and active) provide the 
same photon number distribution, because they have both the same source, the same internal losses 
and the same input power to the monitoring detector. Therefore, the upper and lower bounds of 
photon number probabilities for the passive arrangement can be estimated from those of the 
equivalent active set-up by means of Eqs. (1a, b) using ’ instead of . 
In the following, four cases will be analysed, depending on using infinite/finite keys and 
without/with decoy states. 
 
 
2.2 Infinite key length 
 
In the calculation of the secret key rate R = l / NA (secure bits, l, per pulse sent by Alice, NA) is 
greatly simplified when the key string is considered as having an infinite length. In the context of 
UUS, the security analysis is carried out via untagged pulses [30]; nevertheless, Alice cannot 
measure (with current technology) their gain (Qu) and the QBER (Eu), but the overall Q and E 
values. However, it is possible to provide some bounds based on the random sampling theorem. If 
the estimated upper bound of the probability for tagged pulses, acquired monitoring the pulses in the 
beam splitter (qA/1-qA), is )(tP  ( concerns the infinite key length), the lower bound for untagged 
pulses probability is )(1)(  tu PP , and the upper and lower bounds for the gain and the gain 
times the error, are: 
 
)(/  uu PXX  and })(/))((,0max{  utu PPXX                         (2) 
 
 
with X  Q, EQ. Notice there is no distinction between uP  and simply uP  when it is calculated for 
an infinite key length, so )()(  uu PP , but there will be in the finite key case. The secret key rate 
for an infinite key length without using decoy states is: 
 
))}(1()( )( { 1212 uu EhQEhEfQqR 

                                          (3) 
 
1101  PPQQ uu  being the lower bound for one-photon-untagged pulses and uu QEQE 11 /   
its upper bound QBER; 0P  and 1P  are calculated using the Eq. (1a) and (1b). The q value is the 
probability that Alice and Bob use the same basis in the measurement step, so in the infinite key 
length q = ½, f(E) is the error correction inefficiency and h2 is the usual binary Shannon information 
function. 
The decoy method improves the performance of the QKD set-ups in the key-generation-rate as 
well as in the maximal secure distance Lmax (defined as the maximum transmission distance yielding 
a positive secure-key-rate). Alice assigns each bit randomly (or according to some probability PS) to 
a signal or decoy state and both are attenuated internally with different transmittances S,D. For 
signal and decoy pulses, normally D < S. The fundamental assumptions [33] of the decoy method 
are Dn
S
n YY   (the yield of an n-photon state for both the signal and decoy are equal) and 
D
n
S
n EE   
(the QBER for both the signal and decoy states are equal). In this scenario, Eve only knows the 
output photon number (n) of each pulse. Unfortunately, if Eve has some knowledge about the 
source, the aforementioned main assumptions of the decoy state method fail [34]. This is the case of 
UUS, in which Eve knows the output (n) as well as the input photon number (m), being able to carry 
out an attack depending on both values. In this case the parameter that is the same is Ym,n (the 
conditional probability that Bob’s detectors click given that the pulse enters Alice’s set-up with 
photon number m and is emitted with photon number n). Now the yield Yn = m P(m|n) Ym,n (P(m|n) 
being the conditional probability that a m-photon pulse enters Alice’s set-up and is emitted as an n-
photon pulse). As P(m|n) depends on Alice’s internal transmittances, being S  D, the yields will 
be different for signal and decoy states ( Dn
S
n YY  ). In a similar way 
D
n
S
n EE  , being 
DS
nmE
,
,  (the 
QBER of pulses with m input and n output photons) for signal and decoy states, respectively. 
For the case of infinite key length and using the weak + vacuum two state decoy protocol, the 
secret key generation rate is [30]: 
 
 ))(1(  )()( )(  1212 SuSuuSSSSD EhQPEhEfQPqR                           (4) 
 
Where SQ  and SE  are the overall gain and QBER of the signal states that can be measured 
experimentally; PS is the probability for a signal pulse to be sent (in the case of decoy random 
choosing, PS=1/2) and 
S
uQ1  and 
S
uE1  are the lower and upper bound of the gain and the QBER, 
respectively, of the single photon states in untagged signal pulses, that can be estimated through the 
equations [30]: 
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Vu
V
u QE  being the lower bound of the error times the gain for the vacuum untagged pulses and can be 
evaluated by means of Eq. (2) as ))(/))((,0max(  ut
VVV
u
V
u PPQEQE , as well as the remaining 
upper and lower bounded magnitudes related to the gain. In the infinite key length, 2/1VE . To 
calculate the probabilities, Eq. (1a) and (1b) should be used.  
 
 
2.3 Finite key length 
 
The effect of using finite keys in the security bounds is not negligible [35]. The previous equations 
are for the secure key rate assuming their infinite length. However, the experimental set-ups are 
implemented for a finite period of time, providing finite key lengths. Strictly speaking, the length of 
the secret key generated in this case depends on the level of security required through externally 
imposed parameters. In this context, the concept of -security has been proposed. 
A generic quantum key distribution protocol (without decoy states) has the following steps: the 
emitter (Alice) generates a number of NA pulses, from which the receiver (Bob) detects NB = Q NA  
NA pulses (Q being the gain). After the sifting (NS) and the parameter estimation (NPE) steps, the NB 
initially-shared qubit string is reduced to the raw key having n = NB – NS – NPE < NB qubits, and 
finally, a classic post-processing (error correction and privacy amplification) produces the ultimate 
(smaller) secret key with length l < n. The secret key rate (defined here as secure bits per pulse sent 
by Alice) is R = l / NA = (l/n) (n/NB) (NB/NA) = r q Q (r being the secret fraction and q  ½ for 
BB84). 
To take into account the security under collective attacks within the framework of quantum 
adversaries, in which two classic systems (cc) are correlated with a quantum (q) one, the so-called 
“ccq-states formalism” [36] is needed. Representing the key space of n bits as K  and KA  (kA)
n
 and 
KB  (kB)
n
 (with kA,B  {0, 1}) being the individual keys held by Alice and Bob, Eve has the state 
 BA
KK
E
 which is correlated with the keys KA, KB  K. The overall system can be described by the 
ccq-state 
 
BA
BA
BA
KK
EBBA
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ABAEKK KKKK,KKP  

  )(   
,
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P(KA,KB) being a probability distribution defined in KK, and KA  KB (in general). In this context, 
the definition for -security key has been introduced in [41, 15]: 
Let EKK BA  be a ccq-state describing a classic pair of different keys (KA, KB) together an adversary 
holding the quantum system E. The pair of keys (KA, KB) is said to be -secure with respect to E, if 
and only if the condition ½|| EUUEKK BA   ||1   is fulfilled, where .1 is the trace norm (or L1-
distance defined by means of this norm) and E
K
EUU KKKK  
KK
1
 is the ideal 
ccq-state, reflecting a uniformly distributed key (represented by the completely mixed state UU) 
and uncorrelated from the eavesdropper knowledge (represented by a tensor product of 
)( EKKKKE BABAtr   state). 
The  parameter can be interpreted as the maximum probability that no secure key is generated 
[37, 38]. The security definitions based on a negligible accessible information do not imply 
universal security [39], especially in the context of quantum adversaries. However, the previous -
secure security definition is universally secure [40,41] because the L1-distance cannot increase 
under the action of any quantum operation [41]. If a key is -secure with respect to E, the mutual 
information between the key and E is small, whereas the inverse is not, in general, true. 
Using the previous definition of an -secure key, a new secret key rate can be established [38, 
41] for finite key lengths. The starting point is a situation in which a correct key is shared KA = KB = 
K and privacy amplification is carried out to get the final key of length l fulfilling: 
 
)/2(log 2)|(  2min PAKE EH 
   
 
PA being the probability that privacy amplification fails, and )|( min EH KE
  the quantum 
conditional  -smooth-min-entropy of KE given HE (eavesdropper’s Hilbert space). The whole of 
Eve’s information (E) can be separated into two pieces, E  “E + C”, representing the information 
Eve can get by attacking the channel directly (E) and through the additional data (C) exchanged 
throughout the channel in the error correction process. In order to take into account the error 
probabilities coming from wrong error correction and parameter estimation, we have to proceed 
backward in the whole QKD protocol, from the starting point considered above [21]. 
The  -smooth-min-entropy can be bounded as )|( min EH KE
   )|( min ECECKH 

 
ECK leakH  )|( min EE
 , the last term being the leakage of information in the error correction step 
leakEC  f(E) h2(E) + log2(2/EC), and EC being the probability that the error correction step fails. 
The  -smooth-min-entropy term )|( min EEKH 
  (defined as usual [42]) has to calculated, but the 
task is (in general) impossible. However, in the case of collective attacks, the state has a tensor 
product structure 
n
k)(kKE
σρρ n


 , (  refers to the information extracted per qubit directly from 
the channel) allowing its bounding [41] by means of )|( min EEKρH

 
))()|(()|( min 
  



 k
nn
k σSnσH  with 
21
2 ))log1((7)(
//nεεδ  ,   > 0 being a parameter 
to be optimized and )(   kktr  . The conditional von Neumann entropy )|(   kS  has to be 
evaluated for a purification  BA kkσ  of the approximate state )(   BABA kkkk tr   such that were in 
the permitted set: 
 
 ),()()(,  
1
m mσ PEkkkkkk BABABAPE    . 
 
For qubits, 2/1)2/))1ln(2)/1((ln(),( mmm PEPE   , m and  being the probability 
distributions obtained with m (finite number) measurements and ideal (infinite number), 
respectively, on the states 
BA kk
σ  compatible with the outcomes of the parameter estimation step and 
PE being its failure probability. Then 





 

)()|S( min)|( kmin 

 σσnρH
PE
k
K EE .  
Taking into account that the final secret key can only be generated by the one-photon untagged 
pulses, the minimum of the conditional von Neumann entropy can be rewritten [1] as uQ1 (1-
h2( uE1 ))/Q, uE1  being the upper bound for the QBER of the one-photon untagged pulses and uQ1  
the lower bound for its gain. 
Putting all the previous facts together, the achievable secure finite key rate is [38]: 
 
))}(1(  ))( )(( { 1212 uu
F EhQEhEfQqR                                 (6) 
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being the correction coming from the finiteness of the key. 
Bearing in mind all of the process, the whole security parameter  for the final key has been split 
into several contributions, PEECPA   , some of these should be optimized (as will be 
shown in section 3) to provide the smallest  value and the largest secret key rate. 
In the asymptotic limit of large (infinite) number pulses, Eq. (6) and (7) are in accordance with 
the Devetak-Winter bound [36] for the secret key rate, R = S(KA|Z) – H(KA|KB), S and H being the 
conditional von Neumann and Shannon entropies, respectively, evaluated for the joint state of Alice 
and Eve and for Alice and Bob. 
The Eq. (6) and (7) can be used in the context of decoy states together with the same  
correction and the estimation of uQ1  and uE1  by means of the Eq. (5a) and (5b), including the 
suitable finite data fluctuation in the estimation of uP . The secure finite key rate is: 
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3 Numerical simulation of secure key rates 
 
In the following, a numerical simulation using the set-up shown in figure 1, will be carried out. Four 
situations will be considered: without/with decoy states together infinite/finite key length. 
The “plug-and-play” set-up assumes a UUS situation. Therefore, Alice should not suppose any 
photon distribution from Bob’s source but, in order to be able to calculate the main characteristics of 
the pulses, an outgoing Poissonian distribution is assumed to be released by Bob, with average 
photon number MB. In all cases addressed, a passive set-up has been considered. Consequently, after 
the channel attenuation (characterized by the loss coefficient ), Alice’s beam splitter qA/1-qA and 
internal attenuation (characterized by transmittance  when no decoy states are used or by S,D if 
signal and decoy states are included), the average photon number for the pulses sent to Bob is  = 
MA  qA = MA ’ qA’ = MA ’ (1-qA) (or S,D = MA S,D qA with decoy states) with MA = MB 
10/10 L . 
In plug-and-play systems, the distance L is considered as the spatial separation between Alice and 
Bob, even though a round trip of the pulses is taken into account in order to calculate the real losses. 
Depending on the experimental strategy used, different lower and upper bounds for the gain and 
QBER will be considered depending on the uP  estimation. 
Some values for the parameters used in the following simulation are taken from [43] (B = 
0.045,  =0.21 dB/km, Y0 = 1.7 10
-6
, edet = 0.033) and the remaining ones are chosen as 
representative values (MB = 10
6
, qA = 0.01, f(E) = 1.22, E0 = 0.5, 
VE0  = 0.5, EC = 10
-10
 and the total 
security parameter of the generated keys  = 10-9). 
 
 
 
3.1 Without decoy states 
 
In this paragraph the effect of a finite key length in the secure key rate is considered, when decoy 
states are not used. Similar results have already been reported in [30] with infinite key length and 
are recalculated here in order to compare the effect of the finite key case. The simulation uses Eq. 
(3) and (6). Assuming a Poissonian photon distribution for Bob’s source (with average photon 
number MB), Alice’s source is also Poissonian with average photon number  = MA  qA. The 
overall gain (Q) and QBER (E) can be calculated by means of  eYQ 10  and 
)1( det00
 eeYEQE , and the untagged pulse probability is )2/)1(()( AAu qMerfP   , 
Y0 and E0 ( 0.5) being the background yield and its error, and edet the intrinsic error rate for the 
detector. The parameters  and  are numerically optimized to provide the largest key rate. As is 
discussed in [31] the efficiency of a passive strategy is improved if more photons are sent to the 
intensity monitor, meaning a small qA value. Here qA = 0.01 and MB = 10
6
 are taken as reasonable 
values and the results of R

 are in accordance with those published in [31] (see figure 2a). 
Now the finite-key case is addressed. As was mentioned before, Alice sends Bob a number of NA 
pulses, from which the receiver (Bob) detects NB  NA. In fact, these NA pulses come from Bob’s 
source (in a previous round trip) with the initial average photon number MB, attenuated by the 
channel losses, and are sent back to Bob. The raw key has length n = NB - NS - NPE < NB, NS and NPE 
being the number of pulses used in the sifting and parameter estimation processes, respectively. To 
conclude, a classic post-processing (error correction and privacy amplification) produces the final 
secret key length l < n. The secret key rate is calculated using Eq. (6) and (7). However, now to 
estimate uQ , a finite number (NA) of untagged pulses has to be taken into account, so the 
distribution probability of untagged pulses (Pu(NA)) will have a deviation characterized by the 
condition ),()()( AuuAu NPNP  . The new lower and upper bounds for the untagged and 
tagged pulses probabilities are ),()()( AuuAu NPNP   and )(1)( AuAt NPNP  , and using Eq. 
(2): 
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The total security parameter for the finite key QKD protocol is  = PA + EC +   + u + E, 
showing several error contributions: PA in privacy amplification, EC is the error in the error 
correction,   bounding the  -smooth-min-entropy term and two contributions to the parameter 
estimation term, one coming from the estimation of untagged-pulses probability (u) and another 
from the QBER (E) estimation, with the deviations of (u, NA) and (E, mE), respectively; mE 
being the number of pulses used to estimate the QBER. The finite secret key rate R
F
 is calculated 
considering fixed typical values for , EC, qA and MB and optimizing the remaining parameters {PA, 
 , u, E, , , mE} to get a maximum secret key rate. Note that NPE is the number of pulses used in 
the parameter estimation processes, and the present passive set-up does not decrease the number of 
pulses in the untagged-probability estimation process [31]. As a consequence, the only step that 
removes pulses in the parameter estimation comes from the QBER, then NPE  mE. 
In figure 2a, the effect of the finiteness on the secret key rate is shown. Only when NA  10
14
 the 
R
F
  R. Assuming NB - NS  NB/2 (then n = NB - NS - NPE = NB/2 - mE) the number of pulses mE 
used to estimate the QBER should increase with the distance L. Figure 2b show the relationship r = 
mE/(NB/2) as representing the optimum percentage of sampling qubits with respect the sifted key 
(NB/2) required to estimate the QBER. For instance, using a set-up with the previously specified 
parameters, for NA = 5 10
10
, the sifted key has NB/2  4 10
6
 bits, mE  7 10
5
, then an rS  18% of the 
sifted key should be sacrificed in order to reach the maximum secure distance of Lmax  20 km 
having R
F
  2 10-6. Obviously, by keeping the same RF, increasing the number of pulses until NA = 
10
14
, it would possible to reach Lmax = 33 km, sacrificing only 1.5% of the sifted key. Figure 2c 
shows the optimal average photon number per pulse  = MA  qA as a function of L. Only the results 
for NA = 5 10
10
 are shown because for a bigger NA the curves are closer to that of the infinite case. 
In order to see the L-threshold for a positive R
F
 value, the maximum secure distance (Lmax, in 
km) fulfilling the (reasonable mathematical) condition R
F
  10-9 is shown in figure 3 (lower curve), 
versus the number of pulses sent by Alice (logNA). In order to provide a threshold for positive 
values of the secure key rate, the equation Lmax(R
F
  10-9, NA) = 0, is solved to obtain a value of NA = 
NA
th
  109. Therefore, for NA  NA
th
, a positive value of the secret key rate will be obtained and the 
whole QKD process is secure, assuming the values of the remaining parameters constant. 
 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Secure key rate versus L when no decoy states are used (RF,(L)): (solid line) infinite key length, non-solid lines 
are for several key lengths: NA = 5 10
10 (dotted line), NA = 10
11 (dashed line), NA = 10
12 (dot-dash line), and NA = 10
14 (long 
dashed line). (b) Relationship r = mE/(NB/2) versus L for NA = 5 10
10, 1011, 1012, 1014 (the same lines as before are used). (c) 
Optimal average photon number per pulse () for: infinite key (solid line) and NA = 5 10
10 (dotted line). 
 
Fig. 3. Maximum secure distance (Lmax in km) as a function of logNA for: upper curve, with the condition RD
F = 10-9, lower 
curve RF = 10-9. The asymptotic straight (dashed) lines are the limits for NA =  calculated with the condition R
 or  RD
  = 
10-9: upper line providing Lmax  123 km and lower line providing Lmax  40 km. 
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3.2 With vacuum+weak decoy states 
 
In this paragraph the effect of a finite key length in the secure key rate is considered, when decoy 
states are used. Some results have already been reported by [30] for infinite key length and are 
recalculated here in order to compare the effect of the key finiteness. 
The infinite key length ( = 0) simulation uses Eq. (4). The overall gain and QBER are given by 
 DSeYQ DS ,10
,   and )1( ,det00
,,  DSeeYEQE DSDS

 , S,D = MA S,D qA being the signal and 
decoy pulses intensities. The protocol assumes a strategy in which the signal and decoy states are 
chosen randomly, then PS = ½ in Eq. (4). The values of 
S
uQ1  and 
S
uE1  are calculated by means of Eq. 
(5a) and (5b) and )2/)1(()()( AAtt qMerfcPP   . The parameters S,D and  are 
numerically optimized to maximize the key rate (Eq. (4)). As previously assumed, qA = 0.01 and MB 
= 10
6
 are taken as reasonable values. The results of DR  are in accordance with those published in 
[30]. 
As the random signal-pulse strategy (with PS = ½) is not the optimal method, the probability PS 
should be optimized fulfilling the condition PS + PD + PV = 1, PS,D,V being the probabilities for the 
signal, decoy and vacuum pulses to be chosen by Alice. Therefore, for each value of L, Alice has NA 
initial pulses (received from Bob), from which she chose SA
S
A PNN   and DA
D
A PNN   as signal 
and decoy states. After Bob’s detections, they share NAPSQ
S
 and NAPDQ
D
 detected pulses. Once the 
sifting and parameter estimation have been carried out, the raw key signal states has length 
S
E
S
SA mQPNn  2/ , 
S
Em  being the signal pulses used to estimate the error and that should be 
optimized for each L.  
To calculate the secure key rate effect, Eq. (8) and (7) are used. The bounded magnitudes for 
signal and decoy states can be calculated by means of Eq. (2). Now the appropriate finite fluctuation 
has to be included in several places. In order to calculate the values for DuQ ,
S
uQ  and 
V
uQ , the 
fluctuations are incorporated by means of the untagged probabilities  ),()( iA
i
uu
i
u NPP  , i=S, 
D, V, affected by the errors iu . In addition, the signal error estimation introduces a new error as 
),( SE
S
E
SS mEE  , SEm  being the number of pulses used to estimate the QBER of signal pulses. 
Again, the total security parameter for this finite key QKD protocol is 
S
E
V
u
D
u
S
uECPA   , showing three new error contributions to the parameter 
estimation coming from the probability of untagged-pulses and another from the QBER ( SE ). The 
final secret key rate R
F
 is calculated considering fixed typical values for , EC, qA and MB and 
optimizing the remaining parameters { VDS
S
EDS
S
E
V
u
D
u
S
uPA P,P,P,m,,,,,,,,,  } to get a 
maximum secret key rate. In spite of all the parameters being optimized, as already mentioned in 
[24], the secure key rate values are almost independent of { Vu
D
u
S
uPA  ,,,, } when they are 
changed within a rational range. The most important parameters are the total number of pulses used 
and the signal-to-decoy states relationship. 
Figure 5a displays the results for DR  and 
F
DR , showing a significant increase in the maximal 
secure distance Lmax with respect to those obtained without using decoy states. This is also reflected 
in figure 3 (upper curve). With this strategy, and the parameters used, a number of NA  10
16
 pulses 
should be used in order to reach a secure key rate near the DR . It is remarkable that in the short and 
medium distances region, a higher key rate is obtained by means of a finite number of pulses if the 
probabilities PS,D,V are optimized instead of taking PS = ½. In order to see the L-threshold for a 
positive FDR  value, the maximum secure distance (Lmax, in km) fulfilling the condition 
F
DR   10
-9
, is 
shown in figure 3 (upper curve), versus the number of pulses sent by Alice (logNA). In order to 
provide a threshold for the positive values of the secure key rate, the equation Lmax(
F
DR  10
-9
, NA) = 
0, is solved to obtain a value of NA = NA
th
  3 108. Therefore, for NA  NA
th
, a positive value of the 
secret key rate will be obtained and the whole QKD process is secure assuming the values of the 
remaining parameters constant. Decoy states decrease the threshold needed to get positive secret 
key rates in almost one order of magnitude. 
Figure 5b shows the optimized probabilities versus L (distance between Alice and Bob). The 
value of PD increases with L, indicating that more resources are needed to estimate the error bounds. 
In the limit of quasi-infinite key length (NA  10
16
), almost all the pulses should be considered as 
signals. The probabilities are near ½ only in the long L region. Out of this L range, sending more 
signals than decoy states provides higher secure key rate. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. (a) Secure key rate versus L when decoy states are used ( )(, LRFD
 ), for: NA = 5 10
10 (dotted line), 1011 (dashed line), 
1012 (dot-dash line), 1014 (long dashed line), 1016 (space dashed line) optimizing PS, PD and PV, and infinite key length (solid 
line). (b) Optimized probabilities PS (upper curves), PD (lower curves) versus L (with the same line notation). (c) rD = 
S
Em /(NAPSQ
S/2) relationship versus L for NA = 5 10
10, 1011, 1012, 1014 (with the same line notation). (d) Signal and decoy 
intensity pulses versus L (with the same line notation). 
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The raw key is n = NAPSQ
S
/2 – SEm , and figure 5c shows the relationship )2//(
S
SA
S
ED QPNmr   
as representing the optimum percentage of sampling qubits with respect to the sifted signal key 
(NAPSQ
S
/2) required to estimate the QBER. The number of pulses SEm  used to estimate the QBER 
increases with the distance L. In order to compare the effect of including decoy states, for the case 
of NA = 5 10
10
 and Lmax  20 km (maximum secure distance without decoy states), now the 
sacrificed sifted key is Dr   3 % and 
F
DR  = 4 10
-4
, a value two orders of magnitude larger than that 
obtained without decoy states. On the other hand, to have a value of FDR   4 10
-6
 with NA = 5 10
10
 
using decoy states, the sacrificed sifted key is rate Dr   16 % but Lmax  60 km. 
Figure 5d details the signal and decoy pulsed intensities versus L. The intensities of decoy pulses 
increase with L reflecting that larger resources for key distribution are needed. In addition, their 
intensities are higher than those obtained in the infinite key length case. 
Finally, in order to identify the terms that have the largest losses due to the finite key effect, tests 
have been carried out including decoy states. As an example, Eqs. (4) and (8), have been checked 
for both infinite and finite key length, respectively. For the latter case, NA = 5 10
10
 (see figure 5a) is 
considered, the relationship being DR /
F
DR (L=60)  10. The first term in (8) (related to the error 
correction process) includes a  correction that is negligible, because the errors involved 
( PAPE ,,  ) are affected by a logarithm and, always, divided by n (the raw key length). As a 
consequence, this term does not give rise to any significant differences in the key rates. The second 
term (related with the privacy amplification process) in both equations has a crucial behaviour as its 
value in FDR  is around 25 times smaller than in 

DR . The origin of this difference is located in the 
upper bound of the quantum-bit-error-rate of the signal pulses, because (for L = 60 km) 
(4)) Eq. key, (infinite E  5 (8)) Eq. key, (finite E Su1
S
u1  , even increasing dramatically for L > 60. This is 
also reflected in the values of Su1Q , where (8)) Eq. key, finite(Q 
S
u1 (4))/5 Eq. key, infinite(Q
S
u1 . 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The security of the plug-and-play passive set-up has been analysed for the BB84 QKD protocol 
when the effect of finite key lengths is included. An unknown and untrusted source scenario is 
assumed, reflecting a situation in which the eavesdropper could tamper with the source and the 
channel completely. For the values of the parameters used, this arrangement is -secure for a wide 
range of pulse number. Using decoy states enlarges the maximal secure length significantly as well 
as the secure key rates for all the number of pulses considered. It is particularly noticeable that using 
finite key lengths can provide larger key rates if the rate between the number of signal to decoy 
states is optimized. This behaviour appears in the short and medium distance region. 
In spite of the numerical simulation involving the optimization of the main parameters, the 
results conclude that the most important parameters are the total number of pulses used and the 
signal-to-decoy-state relationship. The parameters related to the error correction process (the first 
term in the key rate) has little effect on the final key rates. The main influence resulting from the 
finite key length concerns the upper bound of the quantum-bit-error-rate of signal pulses. This 
directly affects the term coming from the privacy amplification process and in the lower bound of 
one-photon untagged pulses. 
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